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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on this Court pursuant to section 78-
2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in awarding sole physical custody of 
the parties' minor child to petitioner. Considerable discretion is given to the trial 
court in making custody decisions, '"unless it appears that the trial court has given 
short shrift to the statutory criteria.'" Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 916 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (quoting Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its custody award 
is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cf. Entropy v. Entropy, 
914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The issue of custody of the parties' 
minor child was preserved by Respondent's Answer and Counterclaim to 
Petitioner's Verified Complaint for Divorce (R.30) and certification of the issue to 
the trial court (R.341). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is not 
underemployed and refusing to impute income to her. Appellate courts may not 
set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the finding is clearly erroneous. 
Roderick v. Ricks. 2002 UT 84,127, 54 P.3d 1119. Whether the trial court's 
findings of fact are sufficient to support its conclusion that income should not be 
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imputed petitioner is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cf. 
Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The issue of 
whether full-time income should be imputed to petitioner was preserved by 
respondent's closing argument at trial (R.646, at 44:21-45:8). 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony to petitioner. 
The trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will 
not be disturbed if the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by 
the appellate courts. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, | 7, 80 P.3d 
153. Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its alimony 
award is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Cf. Endrody v. 
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The issue of alimony was 
preserved by Respondent's Answer and Counterclaim to Petitioner's Verified 
Complaint for Divorce (R.30) and certification of the issue to the trial court 
(R.341). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central 
importance to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF '11 iL LAbE 
This appeal is troin a I null judgiik-nl oi < rd District Court dissolving 
the parties' nian'iae^ and rnierin)' oiders regarding custody, child support, 
and alimony. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
Petitioner Kristyna Diane Rose ("petitioner") initiated divorce proceedings 
against respondent Donovan T Rnsc ("respondent ) on Mai 27. 2\n)\ after less 
than three years of marriage (K 4> In her \eniled u mplaif l I -i ili\oi'ee, 
petitioner requested that she be aw at (led ihe llpei nuuirnl eare, custody and control 
of the parties' minor link!,' (R.\1I M > i 1\ fad\ sen Rose, born September 5, 2002, 
and that lespondenl 's I'iiiviil-lime with the child be supervised (R.9, % **] 
Respondent hied :m answer and counterclaim and also requested an award of sole 
a istody of Madysen (R.30, 34, ^ 7). 
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for temporary relief, again requesting 
that respondent have supervised parent-time or \ i ^*. * » 
request that visitation be supervised i e. M .i-. >*\ . *< * )• r Kcu 'advised 
by counselors an.. .;....• ,. - oondent | aouiu nvi be allowed 
unsupervist* "* -l ^ (K.5(), |^ 10j. " Petitioner also requested an 
a- r * •.. * i -.*, HI the amount of $1,000 per month (R.55,1^- u it 
aitted no financial declaration ur oi.^r evidence of need. She claimed to r>e 
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"unemployed," but also working for her sister "in return for her paying my 
attorney's fees" (R.59, f 12). 
Respondent filed a responsive affidavit (R.74), and a complete financial 
declaration listing his gross income and his expenses, which included maintenance 
of the parties' marital debt in the amount of $734 per month, and attached a 
current pay stub (R.65). 
Petitioner's motion was heard September 16, 2003 before the domestic 
relations commissioner. Petitioner was awarded temporary sole legal and physical 
custody of Madysen, and respondent was awarded temporary parent-time, 
unsupervised, per the minimum schedule for noncustodial parents set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-35.5 (R. 181-82, fflf 1-2). The court ordered a custody 
evaluation to be performed, with the parties to agree upon the evaluator (R. 182, 
f 4). Respondent was ordered to maintain payments "on all debt owed by the 
Respondent or the parties" (R.183, f 9). The issue of temporary alimony was 
reserved (R.182,1 7). 
On September 29, 2003, petitioner filed an objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation, taking issue with the commissioner's failure to recommend that 
respondent's parent-time be supervised (R.92). In support of her motion, 
petitioner re-filed her own affidavit and, additionally, filed the affidavit of her 
sister, which alleged that respondent had been abusive with her children and other 
4 
children in the family (K. I III \ IV'htionu ahi) requested a s(a\ of the order 
allowing respondent unsupervised parenl-tiiiie with Madysen (R. 128). The 
object . . ling dated November 18, 2003 (R. 196). 
i in Ni n rmhiT 14, 2003, petitioner sought and obtained a temporary 
Restraining order, without notice to counsel for respondent or certification 
regarding efforts made to provide such notice, which restrained responds 
exercising parent-time with Madysen (R.20 ?) At the preliniiiiaiy iiijunclinn 
hearing held 10 days later, the temporary restraining ORI.T w as drssols w\ and the 
court ordered petitioner ' not lo uitei leie w illi ilelrrul tnf \ \ isiiation with the child 
(R.224i I In: 11Mii'1 A\ >C ordered ilial 'i llaid partv act as an intermediary to 
transler the HHU Ini paivnf lime, and that the transfer take place at petitioner's 
honiefR 21.4) 
On February 23, 2004, petitioner filed yet another motion for temporary 
relief, together with a motion for temporary restraining orwc* i;;^ :.nic i v.; JL- ^ 
that respondent1- pjrcnMinc He redikeu LVIOU UK .ii „ 
R.261). Petitioner did not schcu r .IIK:;:I!L. 
Subsequei .^valuator, Dr. Heather Walker, 
r . ' - i . . . . . mpleted her evaluation (R.290). A pre-trial 
settlement conference was scheduled for June 16, 2004 (R.3.3-) Respondent filed 
his updated financial declaration on May 3, 2004 (R.295). The updated financial 
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declaration did not include continued maintenance of the parties' marital debt as a 
line item in respondent's expenses, though the total amount or $684 required on a 
monthly basis to maintain the expenses was included in the "Debts and 
Obligations" section of the financial declaration (R.296-97). Respondent's 
monthly expenses, without the $684 included for debt maintenance, were 
$1,760.79 (R.299), his gross income was $2,166.67, and his net income was 
$1,891.85 (R.296). 
Petitioner did not file a financial declaration or other evidence of any kind 
to indicate her income or expenses. 
Dr. Walker submitted her child custody settlement conference report June 
16, 2004 at the pre-trial settlement conference held that same date (R.652). In her 
report, Dr. Walker addressed the Rule 4-903 factors, noting that Madysen 
displayed equal attachment to both parents (R.652, at 3, f 3), that petitioner "tends 
to be overly dependent upon her family and is submissive to their wishes" (R.652, 
at 3, | 5.a.), that petitioner had made allegations of abuse against Donovan and 
reported him to child protective services, but the allegations had been found by the 
Division of Child and Family Services to be "Without Merit" and the Division had 
expressed concern about petitioner's inconsistencies in the reporting (R.652, at 3, 
| 5.i.), that petitioner had not been willing to provide maximum access to 
respondent (R.652, at 4,16.A.), that petitioner was unable to set good boundaries 
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between herself and Madysen (R.652, at 4, f 6.B.), and that petitioner was unable 
to put Madysen's need for her father ahead of her own dislike or fear of 
respondent (R.652, at 4, f 6.C.). Dr. Walker also noted that "one factor that plays 
a major role is that Kristyna's family does not like Donovan and does not 
encourage visitation. The concern is that over time Madysen will be exposed to 
much denigration of her father, and this is a set up for parent rejection" (R.652, at 
5). 
Dr. Walker recommended, inter alia, that respondent's parent-time with 
Madysen increase "until there is a three-day, four-day split", with the four-day 
parent being petitioner if she was cooperative with the process and respondent if 
she was not. Dr. Walker also recommended that the parties participate in therapy, 
attend a high-conflict co-parenting class, attend parenting classes, communicate 
directly, and that exchanges of the child take place at Willwin, a neutral setting, 
rather than at petitioner's home through the third-party intermediary designated by 
petitioner (R.652, at 5). 
At the conclusion of the settlement conference, the commissioner certified 
the matter for trial on the issues of custody, debt allocation, alimony, and attorney 
fees (R.341). Thereafter, respondent requested a trial setting (R.343). 
Petitioner objected to respondent's request for a trial setting (R.349) and 
filed a motion for temporary relief requesting, inter alia, the appointment of Dr. 
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Earl R. Seegrist to perform a second custody evaluation (R.369-70). This relief 
was granted at a hearing held August 11, 2004 before the domestic relations 
commissioner (R.426). Subsequently, the trial court granted petitioner a 45-day 
continuance of the scheduled trial date to allow the second evaluation to be 
completed (R.442). 
Dr. Seegrist submitted his custody evaluation report September 28, 2004, 
two days prior to trial (R.652, at 7). Dr. Seegrist addressed the Rule 4-903 factors, 
as did Dr. Walker. Dr. Seegrist found that Madysen had bonded with both parents 
and that both parents were appropriate, nurturing and demonstrated good parent-
child interaction (R.652, at 8, Tf 5.C.). Dr. Seegrist expressed concern about 
petitioner's "unwillingness to cooperate and work openly with respondent" 
(R.652, at 8, f 5.D.), and the strong negative influence that petitioner's mother had 
on petitioner, which "given the structure of [petitioner's] enmeshed and 
controlling family system," raised significant doubt as to whether respondent "will 
ever have open, emotionally healthy, unrestricted access to perform his role as 
Madysen's father" (R.652, at 9-10, ffi[ 5.E.vii & 5.F). Dr. Seegrist emphasized that 
petitioner "demonstrates unfounded fears of respondent that are believed to be 
fostered, if not originated from her mother. . . . [Petitioner] appears to be overly 
suggestible to her mother's opinions. If [petitioner] can gain physical, emotional 
and financial independence from her family, she will be much better suited to act 
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in Madysen's best interest" (R.652, at 11). Finally, Dr. Seegrist expressed concern 
over petitioner's "possible malicious filing of faults [sic], misleading or 
irresponsible suspicions] of sexual abuse," noting that this type of behavior "may 
significantly hamper a positive father-daughter relationship between Donovan and 
Madysen" (R.652, at 10,1 (5)(E)(ix). 
Dr. Seegrist recommended that the parties share joint legal and physical 
custody of Madysen, "with as near to equal time as can be logistically arranged" 
(R.652, at 11). He concluded, "It is in Madysen's best interest that she have both 
parents involved with her. However, if one parent seeks to restrict Madysen's 
access to the other parent, it is in Madysen's best interest to be placed in the Full 
Physical and Legal custody of the open, non-restricting parent, with the other 
parent receiving Utah Statutory Visitation. This is to ensure the most stable and 
emotionally nurturing home environment for Madysen" (R.652, at 11). 
The bench trial commenced September 30, 2004 at 10:30 a.m., as scheduled. 
The parties each testified. No exhibits were introduced, and no witnesses other 
than the parties were called (R.646). 
With respect to her monthly expenses, petitioner testified only that she paid 
$300 per month in rent (R.646, at 10:15). She submitted no financial declaration 
or other evidence of need. She also testified that she was living with her parents 
and receiving assistance from them (id. at 10:23 - 11:2). She testified that she was 
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aware of only three marital debts (id- at 18:1-11), which she was not in a financial 
position to pay except "a little bit at a time" (id- at 19:9-13), which is why, she 
testified, she was "hoping for alimony if he's not going to take care of [the marital 
debt]" (id.). 
As to her ability to meet her own need, petitioner testified that she was 
employed at Bluffdale Elementary as a PE specialist (id. at 8:17). She testified 
that she made $8.17 per hour and worked 12 hours per week (id. at 8:21). She 
testified that she was employed during the marriage full-time, that she had no 
disability that would prevent her from working full-time now (id. at 20:11-18), and 
that her mother cared for Madysen while she worked at no cost to her (id. at 15:20-
16:5). 
On the issue of custody, petitioner testified that "[T]he most important thing 
for my daughter right now would be a stable environment where she's not going to 
be changed, moved around a lot, because it would be hard on me, but I feel that 
Madysen, the best interest for Madysen is to have a relationship with both of her 
parents but also if we can try not to have her moved around as much as possible" 
(id- at 14:3). 
For his part, respondent testified that the financial declaration he had filed 
with the court accurately set forth his income, with the exception of a 20-cent raise 
that he received July 1, 2005, his expenses, and the marital debt (id. at 34:11-23). 
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As to custody, respondent testified that he did not believe that petitioner's 
actions in the past year showed that she understood that Madysen's spending time 
with both parents and having a relationship with both parents is in fact in 
Madysen's best interest (id. at 29:20-30:5). He testified that it was his desire for 
Madysen to have a relationship with her mother that was not restricted in any way, 
but that he would also like to have that same privilege, as Madysen's father (id. at 
37:1-11). 
Thereafter, counsel for the parties gave closing argument, concluding their 
comments at 11:27 a.m. The court ruled from the bench at 11:30 a.m., and the 
court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (R.569) and Decree of Divorce 
(R.599) based thereon were entered April 14, 2005. 
The court awarded the parties joint legal custody of Madysen, with 
petitioner being awarded sole physical custody, subject to respondent's parent-
time pursuant to the minimum schedule for non-custodial parents set forth at Utah 
code Ann. §§ 30-3-35.5 and 30-3-35 (R.577-79, fflf 16-17). The court found, in 
support of this award, that consistency in the caregiving arrangement was an 
important issue for the child, and that respondent would require more surrogate 
care than petitioner in that he works full-time while petitioner works only 12 hours 
per week (R.577-78, f 16.a.). The court also acknowledged and agreed with the 
findings of both the custody evaluators, but took issue with their conclusions that 
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a joint physical custody arrangement would be appropriate, finding that such an 
arrangement would be "productive of considerable on-going dispute between these 
parties" (R.578, ^ 16.b.L). Finally, the court found that there was no evidence to 
support any claim of physical abuse, but that there clearly were "emotional 
resentments and/or disagreements" that would affect the ability of the parties to 
cooperate to the extent required by a joint physical custody order (R.579, f^ 16.c). 
On the issues of child support and alimony, the court found that "no 
persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is 
underemployed." The court declined to impute full-time income to petitioner "in 
light of the fact that Petitioner has cared for and will continue to care for the two 
(2) year old minor child in her home" (R.580, f 19). The court thus determined 
petitioner's gross income to be $424.84 per month, based on a 12-hour work week. 
The court found respondent's gross income to be $2,201.33 per month, based on a 
40-hour work week (R.580, Tf 18). 
As to petitioner's need for alimony, the court found that the need had been 
established by petitioner's testimony that she is supported by her parents and 
receives food stamps and welfare supplements (R.584, ^26). With no other 
findings of any kind pertinent to petitioner's actual expenses, the court concluded 
that a "reasonable and fair sum to be paid for alimony is $750 per month" (id.). 
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As to respondent's ability to pay alimony, the court found, without 
explanation, that respondent had overstated his expenses and that the amount of 
$1,943 per month (determined by averaging respondent's monthly expenses from 
his two financial declarations, less amounts claimed for payment of tithing), "far 
exceeded any disposable earnings or income available to the Petitioner in this 
case" (R.584-85,f27). Thus, the court found, respondent did have the ability to 
pay $750 per month in alimony, in addition to $304.08 in child support (R.580, 
120), and all the marital debt (R.586, f 30). 
The trial court's Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce were entered April 14, 2005. Respondent filed his timely Notice of 
Appeal on April 29, 2005 (R.628). 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner and respondent were married to one another on June 24, 2000 
(R.573, f 8). Their only child, Madysen, was born September 5, 2002 (R.576, 
f 13). The parties were separated after less than three years of marriage, on April 
15, 2003, when petitioner left the marital home with the parties' child while 
respondent was at school (R.74,13; R.573, f 8;). Madysen was 7 months old at 
the time (R.576, f 13). 
The parties both cared for Madysen prior to the separation (R.74,12). 
However, after the separation, petitioner engaged in a concerted effort to restrict 
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respondent's access to Madysen, which included filing false reports of sexual 
abuse with the Division of Child and Family Services (R.652, at 3, | 5.i.; R.652, at 
10, f 5.E.ix.), attempting to deny respondent unsupervised parent-time with 
Madysen (R.9, f 12; R.54,12; R.59, If 10; R.92; R.l 10; R.128), obtaining 
temporary restraining orders on an ex parte and emergency basis prohibiting 
respondent from exercising parent-time with Madysen (R.203), and attempting to 
have respondent's parent-time with Madysen reduced below the statutory 
minimum (R.248; R.261). 
Nevertheless, respondent persevered in maintaining his relationship with 
Madysen, despite petitioner's attempts to undermine the relationship and 
restrictions imposed by the temporary order, which limited his time with Madysen 
to the statutory minimum. At the time of trial, the uncontro verted evidence 
established that the strength of Madysen's bond with respondent was equal to that 
of her bond with petitioner (R.652, at 3, f 3; R.652, at 8, | 5.C.). There is no 
evidence that respondent has ever attempted to restrict petitioner's access to 
Madysen, nor to undermine petitioner's role as Madysen's mother. Respondent's 
desire is for Madysen to have both of her parents in her life, and for both he and 
petitioner to have the privilege of an unrestricted relationship with their daughter 
(R.646, at 37:5-11). 
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Petitioner was employed throughout the marriage (R.381,18), historically 
on a full-time basis (R.646, at 20:11-15). She suffers no disability that prevents 
her from working full-time (R.646, at 20:16-18). Petitioner enjoys free child care 
provided by her mother (R.646, at 15:20-16:5). 
Respondent also worked during the marriage and continued to do so after 
the parties separated. He also has child care available to him, through his sister 
(R.652, at 9, f 5.E.iii). 
At the time of trial, petitioner made $8.17 per hour, for a gross monthly 
income of $1,416.12 if employed full-time. Respondent made $12.70 per hour, for 
a gross monthly income, based on full-time employment, of $2,201.33 (R.580, 
f 18). Respondent's uncontroverted monthly deductions for income tax, FICA, 
and health insurance totaled $274.82 (R.296), leaving him a net monthly income 
of $1,926.51. After payment of child support in the amount of $304.08 per month 
(R.580, Tf 20) and payment of marital debt for petitioner's benefit in the amount of 
$177 per month1 (R.296-97), respondent was left with $1,445.51 per month to 
meet his monthly expenses. 
The three marital debts held in both the parties' name, and therefore 
nondischargeable as to petitioner upon bankruptcy of respondent, are the 
American Express debt of $2,500, with a monthly payment of $122, the Sam's 
Club debt of $480, with a monthly payment of $25, and the US Bank Res. Debt of 
$1,000, with a monthly payment of $30 (R.296-97). 
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Respondent's uncontroverted monthly expenses, not including tithing or 
maintenance of debts in respondent's individual name, were $1,560.79 at the time 
of trial. This budget included nothing for clothing, dental expenses, child care, or 
entertainment. No item on respondent's monthly expenses is unusually high or out 
of the ordinary, and no item was challenged by petitioner in any way or found to 
be unreasonable by the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in awarding sole custody of the parties' child to 
petitioner, placing undue weight on consistency of the caregiving arrangement in 
effect during the interim period prior to trial and on respondent's need for 
surrogate care due to his full-time employment. The undue weight given to 
consistency of caregiving in this case effectively transformed the 15-minute 
proffer hearing at which temporary custody was decided into a conclusive 
determination of permanent custody. The undue weight given to respondent's 
need for surrogate care because he is employed full-time prejudiced respondent for 
fulfilling his statutorily mandated obligation to provide for his child, which, when 
taken together with the court's sanction of petitioner's failure to fulfill her 
obligation of support, is inequitable, discriminates against employed parents, is 
contrary to the public policy of this state, and results in a violation of respondent's 
constitutionally protected right to have the laws of this state applied uniformly. 
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Finally, the court failed to consider or weigh any other facts relevant to the best 
interests of the child in this case, and in particular, failed to consider the statutorily 
mandated factor of which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent, though the reports of both custody evaluators identified this 
factor as having particular significance in this case due to petitioner's enmeshment 
with her family and her history of attempting to limit respondent's contact with 
Madysen. 
The trial court also erred in finding that petitioner was not underemployed, 
though she testified that she works only 12 hours per week, has historically 
worked full-time, and suffers no disability that prevents her from working full-
time. The trial court further erred in refusing to impute income to petitioner 
because she cared for the parties child in her home and would continue to do so. 
The public policy of this state demands of all parents that they support their 
children. It does not permit mothers, but not fathers, or custodial parents, but not 
noncustodial parents, the luxury of choosing to forego their obligation of support 
in favor of staying home to care for the child, except in limited circumstances that 
are not germane in this case. 
Finally, the trial court erred in awarding alimony to petitioner when she 
requested only "contingent alimony" to allow her to pay the parties' joint debt if 
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respondent did not pay it and she made no effort to establish her monthly expenses 
or otherwise quantify her need for alimony. The court also erred in awarding 
alimony to respondent without making adequate findings regarding petitioner's 
need and respondent's ability to pay alimony, simply concluding that $750 per 
month "is a reasonable and fair sum to be paid." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING SOLE 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILD TO PETITIONER 
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 16 sets forth the basis for its physical 
custody award. Of the three subsidiary findings, only 16.a. pertains to the court's 
reasoning for awarding sole custody to petitioner, while 16.c. pertains to the 
court's reasoning for not awarding joint physical custody to both of the parties, 
and 16.b. pertains to the court's reasoning for departing from the custody 
evaluators' joint custody recommendations, while otherwise "acknowledge[ing] 
and agreeing] with the conclusions of both custody evaluators" (R.578, f 16.b.i.). 
The court's Finding No. 16.a. is inadequate to support the court's award of 
sole custody to petitioner. Finding No. 16.a. states that "consistency of care 
provider arrangements is an important issue in this child's life. Surrogate care has 
been and continues to be provided by the child's maternal grandmother, with 
whom Petitioner and the minor child live, at the rate of some twelve (12) hours per 
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week. If respondent were granted primary custody of the minor child, the fact that 
he works forty (40) hours per week would require him to obtain considerably more 
surrogate care" (R.577,116.a.). 
Implicit in this finding is the subsidiary finding that the child's maternal 
grandmother is a positive influence in the child's life and that it is therefore 
beneficial for the child to continue to live with her and to receive surrogate care 
from her. This implicit finding is contrary to the explicit findings of both custody 
evaluators, with which the trial court acknowledged and agreed, that petitioner's 
mother is a negative influence, not a positive influence, in the child's life. Dr. 
Seegrist indicated that petitioner's mother actively initiates and supports conflict 
between the parties (R.652, at 9, ^ 5.E.vii.) and uses her influence to undermine 
respondent's role as Madysen's father (R.652, at 10, ^ f 5.F.). Dr. Walker indicated 
that petitioner's mother does not encourage visitation (R.652, at 5), and will likely 
expose Madysen to denigration of respondent (R.652, at 5). The trial court's 
implicit finding is therefore contradictory and unexplained. 
Nor is the emphasis placed by the trial court on consistency of caregiving in 
general appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The parties separated 
when Madysen was 7 months old, and thus no substantial history of caregiving 
existed with either party during the effective period of the parties' marriage. 
Thereafter, the findings of both custody evaluators, as well as the court papers 
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filed by petitioner herein, establish that petitioner engaged in a pattern of 
interfering with respondent's access to Madysen. It is inequitable to give 
conclusive weight to "consistency of caregiving" when one parent has wrongfully 
deprived the other parent of the opportunity to provide care for the child. 
Further, the findings of the custody evaluators indicate that there is much to 
be concerned about with the caregiving provided by petitioner, most notably with 
respect to petitioner's inability or unwillingness to become independent from her 
parents and provide an environment for Madysen that fosters and supports 
Madysen's right to enjoy an unrestricted and loving relationship with respondent. 
Consistency of a caregiving arrangement that creates "significant doubt. . . as to 
whether [respondent] will ever have open, emotionally healthy, unrestricted access 
to perform his role as Madysen's father" (R.652, atlO, f 5.F.) cannot be said to be 
in Madysen's best interests. Cf. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (endorsing custody evaluator's view that although stability is important, it 
cannot be used to maintain an unsatisfactory situation that creates tension for the 
children). 
Nor is it clear that Madysen is happy and well-adjusted in the present 
caregiving arrangement. Dr. Seegrist determined that follow up regarding a 
potential diagnosis for Madysen of failure to thrive due to environmental causes 
was in order (R.652, at 10, f 5.F). Where there is concern about the quality of 
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caregiving provided by a caregiver, and doubt as to how the child is functioning 
within the caregiving arrangement, consistency of caregiving does not promote, 
and may well be inimical to, the child's best interests. Cf. Elmer v. Elmer, 776 
P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989) (when a child's custody is determined by stipulation or 
default, the custody determination may in fact be at odds with the best interests of 
the child). 
Moreover, the trial court's custody determination in this case is an initial 
determination, not a modification of a previously adjudicated custody award. 
Petitioner's role as "primary caregiver" during the interim period prior to trial 
stems from a temporary custody award made at a 15-minute proffer hearing before 
at domestic relations commissioner. The only evidence pertaining to the child's 
best interests was introduced by the parties' through affidavits. Petitioner claimed 
in her affidavit that she had been the child's primary caregiver "during Madysen's 
lifetime," and that she had made the child available to respondent after separation 
but he had not followed through with scheduled visitation (R.59, fflf 4-10). The 
former statement is conclusory and self-serving, and is disputed by respondent's 
affidavit stating that both he and petitioner cared for Madysen prior to the 
separation (R.74, f 2). This was the sum total of the evidence before the 
commissioner, upon which a determination of temporary custody was made. 
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It is not in Madysen's best interests - or any child's - for custody to be 
effectively decided on such limited evidence. Trial on the issue of permanent 
custody, which in this case will determine a child's fate for the next 16 years, 
affords the court an opportunity to observe the parties' first-hand, to weigh the 
credibility of their testimony and the testimony of witnesses they produce, to be 
educated by a court-appointed expert (or two) who has conducted an independent 
investigation on factors pertaining to the child's best interests, and to carefully and 
thoroughly consider all the relevant custody factors. It should not be an exercise 
in rubber stamping the temporary custody arrangement. In this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by according undue significance to consistency of the 
caregiving arrangement, awarding custody to petitioner primarily because she and 
her mother had been the caregivers of the child pursuant to the temporary order. 
See Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1215-16 (Utah 1996) (emphasizing that "[a] 
temporary custody order is only that, temporary. It is effective only until a full 
informed custody determination can be made at a final hearing"). 
In Finding No. 16.a., the trial court also found, as an additional basis for its 
award of sole custody to petitioner, that respondent's full-time employment would 
necessitate that he obtain more surrogate care for Madysen than the 12 hours per 
week under the caregiving arrangement in place during the interim period. This 
finding cannot justify an award of sole custody to petitioner. The custody 
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evaluators' findings, acknowledged and agreed with by the court, suggest that 
petitioner's unwillingness to support herself and her child is problematic, not 
beneficial, increasing petitioner's dependence on her family. This in turn results 
in Madysen's potential exposure to denigration of her father while living in the 
home of her grandparents and an otherwise unhealthy and enmeshed family 
environment. Under these circumstances, the trial court's implicit and conclusory 
finding that petitioner's limited employment favors her in her claim for custody of 
Madysen is contradictory and should be disregarded. 
Further, the trial court's surrogate care finding has the effect of improperly 
discriminating against parents who are employed full-time. Respondent fulfills his 
statutorily mandated obligation to provide for his child by maintaining full-time 
employment, see discussion supra. It is contrary to the clear public policy of this 
state, which places upon every parent, whether mother or father, an obligation to 
support their children, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 & -4 (2005), to disfavor 
respondent in his claim for custody because he fulfills that mandate. 
Moreoever, the court's unstated finding that the child's mother is not 
required to fulfill her obligation of support, whereas the child's father is, violates 
this state's constitutional guarantee that "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." See Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. Sections 78-45-3 and -4 of the 
Utah Code are identical in their imposition of the duty of support on every mother 
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and every father. These laws must be applied uniformly to mothers and fathers. 
Thus respondent should have no greater need for surrogate care than petitioner, 
insofar as they should each have an equal duty to support Madysen. The trial 
court abused its discretion in imposing upon petitioner no requirement to support 
her child, excusing her from her obligation under the law, and then weighing this 
factor in her favor in her claim for custody of Madysen. 
Finding 16.a. is the only finding contained within the trial court's Findings 
of Fact that pertains to its award of sole custody of Madysen to petitioner. The 
court "acknowledges and agrees with" the findings set forth in the custody 
evaluators' reports, but it is unclear whether these findings are incorporated by 
reference by the trial court. If the findings are incorporated by reference, then the 
trial court's award of sole custody to petitioner does not flow from its findings. If 
the findings are not incorporated by reference, then the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to consider or weigh any other factors, save for consistency of 
caregiving arrangements and relative need for surrogate care, relevant to the best 
interests inquiry. In particular, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
consider or properly weigh the statutorily mandated factor of which parent is most 
likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child frequent 
and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
10(l)(a)(ii). 
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The reports of both custody evaluators identified the ability to act in the best 
interests of the child as a factor having particular significance in this case. 
Petitioner was found by Dr. Seegrist to be enmeshed with her family, which 
limited her ability "to act in Madysen's best interests" (R.652, at 11). Petitioner 
was found by Dr. Walker to be unable to "put Madysen's need for her father ahead 
of her dislike or fear of Donovan" (R.652, at 4, | 6.C.). The court's failure to 
consider this factor or to accord it greater weight in its custody determination 
constitutes and abuse of discretion. 
The trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to support its award of sole 
custody to petitioner. The award should therefore be reversed and remanded for 
entry of appropriate findings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IMPUTE INCOME TO 
PETITIONER 
A. The Trial Court's Finding That Petitioner Is Not 
Underemployed Is Clearly Erroneous 
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 19 states: "No persuasive evidence 
was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is underemployed" (R.580). This 
finding is clearly erroneous. The evidence at trial on the question of petitioner's 
employment is clear and uncontroverted, consists entirely of petitioner's own 
testimony, and demonstrates without ambiguity that petitioner is underemployed. 
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Petitioner testified at trial that she was currently employed at Bluffdale 
Elementary as a PE specialist (id. at 8; 17). She testified that she made $8.17 per 
hour and worked 12 hours per week (id. at 8:21). She also testified that she was 
employed during the marriage full-time and that she had no disability that would 
prevent her from working full-time now (id. at 20:11-18). This evidence 
establishes that petitioner was capable of working full-time, but did not work full-
time. She was therefore underemployed, by definition. 
The policy of this state places upon every parent the responsibility to 
support the children that they bring into this world. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
45-3(1) & -4(1); Department of Human Servs. Ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 
676, 683 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting) (Utah's clear policy is to 
require both parents to support their child to the extent that each is financially 
able). In the divorce context, it is therefore incumbent upon all parents of minor 
children to work full-time. If they choose not to do so, it should be their burden to 
demonstrate that this choice is appropriate and that they should not be deemed 
underemployed pursuant to Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a) of the Utah Code. Cf. 
Betteridge v. Betteridge, 2004 UT App 50, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 123 (Orme, J., 
concurring) (stating minimum wage income should be imputed as a matter of 
course, without requiring challenging spouse to provide evidence that employment 
was available to underemployed spouse). 
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A parent's uncontroverted testimony that they do not work full-time but are 
capable of doing so and have done so necessitates a finding that the parent is 
voluntarily underemployed. Therefore, the trial court's finding that "[n]o 
persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is 
underemployed" is clearly erroneous. This court should set aside the finding and 
direct entry of a finding that petitioner is underemployed, consistent with the 
uncontroverted evidence. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding that Petitioner Has Cared For and 
Will Continue to Care For The Parties' Minor Child in Her 
Home is Insufficient as a Matter of Law to Support Its 
Conclusion that Income Should Not Be Imputed to Petitioner 
The trial court "decline[d] to impute full time income to Petitioner at her 
currently hourly wage" because "Petitioner has cared for and will continue to care 
fo the two (2) year old minor child in her home" (R.580). This is an insufficient 
reason, as a matter of law, to support a determination not to impute income to an 
underemployed parent. 
Caring for a child does not entitle a person not to work, absent exceptional 
circumstances, such as special needs on the part of the child. To the contrary, 
bringing a child into the world places on a person an obligation to support that 
child. This obligation is not gender-specific, and does not inure only to a 
noncustodial parent. As this court has noted, "Utah statutes draw no distinction in 
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terms of support duty between custodial and non-custodial parents nor between 
fathers and mothers. The duty of both is the same: 'Every man shall support his 
child ' Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3(1987); Every woman shall support her child 
. . . .' Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4 (1987)." Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1114, 
n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, custodial mothers are required to support their 
children, insofar as they are capable, to the same extent that noncustodial fathers 
are. 
Further, it is inequitable and violative of the guarantees of this state's 
constitution to place upon one parent, but not the other, an obligation to work full-
time. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. The 
identical statutes pertaining to the obligations of mothers and fathers to support 
their children found at Sections 78-45-3 and -4 of the Utah Code cannot, 
consistent with this provision of the constitution, be applied to permit a mother to 
avoid her duty of support to stay home with her child while a father has no so 
luxury. Cf. Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT App 378, If 16, 18 P.3d 509 (holding that 
father may not disregard his duty to support his child to pursue a college 
education). Utah's child support guidelines "are designed to maximize support to 
children from both parents" id., and no exception is made to allow a mother to 
choose not to do so in order to stay home with her child, except in the limited 
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circumstance that "the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor 
children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(d)(i) (2005). 
This conclusion is further supported by Article IV, Section I of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "Both male and female citizens of 
this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges." 
Utah Const, art. IV, § 1. The right of choice to work or not to work on a full-time 
basis is a civil right that cannot be abridged for male citizens of this state who are 
parents, but not for female citizens of this state who are parents. 
The inequity of the court's determination that petitioner is not required to 
work full-time to support the parties' child is particularly egregious under the 
circumstances of this case, where the court's award of custody to petitioner is 
premised, almost entirely, on its finding that respondent's full-time employment 
would require him to obtain more surrogate care than petitioner requires. Fathers 
who wish to actively participate in their children's lives, but who have been 
designated "noncustodial parents" by a temporary order, are doomed by such 
circular logic. They must work to support their children, but by doing so they 
forfeit their opportunity to be awarded sole or joint custody of their children on a 
permanent basis. Thus, the distinction between "custodial parent" and 
"noncustodial parent" - which may be said to justify the unequal treatment of 
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mothers and fathers vis-a-vis their obligation to support their children - often 
stems directly from that very same unequal application of the duty of support. 
This case does not present a situation where a mother has stayed home 
throughout a marriage of long duration to care for the parties' minor children, and 
must, upon divorce, attempt to enter the work force late in life with no substantial 
work experience or training. Cf. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
The actual duration of the parties' marriage in this case was less than three years, 
during most of which petitioner worked full-time. Petitioner is young and free 
from any physical disability that would prevent her from maintaining full-time 
employment. She did not change her position or forego career or employment 
opportunities to care for the parties' child during the marriage: the sum total of 
the parties' effective marriage after the birth of Madysen was 7 months. She has 
child care available to her at no cost (R.646, at 15:20-16:5) and a father to the 
minor child who is willing and anxious to assume greater parental responsibilities, 
and who the evidence demonstrates should be allowed to do so for the child's best 
interests. Under these circumstances, it is a clear inequity to sanction petitioner's 
decision not to work full-time, thus shortchanging the child's right of support from 
2
 Respondent, on the other hand, did forego career opportunities in order to be in 
a position to care for his daughter after petitioner left the marital residence, turning 
down a position out-of-state (R.74-75,13). 
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her mother and placing a disproportionate burden on respondent to support not 
only the minor child, but also petitioner. 
The trial court's refusal to impute full-time income to petitioner because of 
her role in caring for the parties' child is error, as a matter of law, and should be 
reversed. On remand, the trial court should be directed to impute income to 
petitioner in the amount of $1,416.12 per month, which represents employment of 
40 hours per week at petitioner's uncontroverted wage of $8.17 per hour. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO PETITIONER 
Section 30-3-5(8)(a) of the Utah Code requires a court to consider seven 
factors in determining alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the 
marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to 
any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(vii) (2005). 
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It is the burden of the party who is requesting alimony to establish that her 
or she is entitled to it pursuant to the foregoing factors. Cf Willev v. Willey, 951 
P.2d 226, 231 (Utah 1997) (wife requesting alimony had burden of proving 
monthly need for claimed medical expenses); Peterson v. Peterson, 2001 UT App 
51, Utah App. LEXIS 177 (noting that "alimony is never automatic"). 
Petitioner utterly failed in this case to meet her burden of establishing that 
she is entitled to alimony. Most crucially, petitioner failed to testify regarding her 
monthly expenses, or to submit a financial declaration to the court setting forth 
such expenses. On the issue of need, she testified only that she paid rent of $300 
per month while living with her parents, that she had had help from her parents, 
and that she had been on food stamps (R.646, at 10:13-11:2). 
Petitioner's testimony at trial, and the argument of her counsel in closing, 
indicate that petitioner in fact did not even seek an award of alimony per se, but 
only an award of "contingent alimony" to ensure that she would have the means to 
pay the parties' joint debt if respondent were to file bankruptcy or otherwise fail to 
"take care of it" (R.646, at 19:4-13; R.646, at 42:11-23). Respondent does not 
appeal the trial court's assignment of the parties' debt to him, and he is willing to 
pay the joint debt, whether discharged by him or not, in lieu of alimony. However, 
the trial court abused its discretion and overstepped its proper role by requiring 
respondent to not only pay all the debt of the parties, but also to pay alimony, 
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granting relief to petitioner that petitioner did not request and failed to establish 
entitlement for. Cf. Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1383-84 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (Bench, J., dissenting) ("'Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial 
system of conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's role 
of advocacy. . . . The interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds 
its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be 
dead'") (quoting Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983)). The trial 
court's alimony award should be vacated, without remand. 
Alternatively, the trial court's alimony award should be vacated and the 
matter remanded for entry of findings on the statutorily mandated factors. 
Petitioner's failure to adduce evidence necessary to support an award of alimony is 
evident in the court's failure to make adequate findings to support an award of 
alimony. The sum total of the court's findings pertaining to alimony are set forth 
in Findings of Fact No. 26 and No. 27. As to petitioner's need, the court makes no 
findings as to petitioner's monthly expenses, but instead summarily states that she 
has a need for alimony based on her testimony that she is supported by her parents, 
receives welfare, and pays rent of $300 to her parents. While such testimony 
might establish a general need, it cannot establish the extent of that need in terms 
of a monthly amount, and it provides no basis for the court's conclusory finding 
that "a reasonable and fair sum to be paid for alimony is $750 per month." See 
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Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ffl[ 10-13, 80 P.3d 153 (trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to enter specific findings on wife's financial need 
based on parties' historical standard of living, attempting instead to equalize the 
parties' incomes); Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(findings regarding parties' incomes, omitting expenses, "clearly insufficient to 
allow us to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally 
based"). 
Similarly, the trial court's findings as to respondent's ability to pay are 
inadequate. The court found that averaging the two numbers set forth in 
respondent's financial declaration would result in a finding that it takes $1,943 per 
month to support him. The court did not make such a finding, however, stating 
only: "[T]he Court believes that Respondent has overstated his expenses, and that 
the Respondent does have the ability to pay Petitioner $750.00 per month 
alimony" (R.585,f 27). 
The court does not make any finding regarding what respondent's 
reasonable expenses are and fails to address any line item in respondent's 
uncontroverted financial declaration. 
To support its conclusory finding that respondent has the ability to pay $750 
per month in alimony, the trial court was required to make subsidiary findings 
reducing respondent's monthly expenses to $695.51 per month (representing the 
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difference between $750 and respondent's net income of $ 1,445.51 after taxes, 
payment of child support, and maintenance of joint debt). The uncontroverted 
expenses set forth in respondent's financial declaration establish that his rent and 
car payment alone exceed that amount. 
Respondent does not live with his parents and does not enjoy an essentially 
expense-free existence, as does petitioner. The court's bare statement that it 
believes respondent's expenses to be inflated is simply insufficient to support the 
court's conclusory finding that respondent has the ability to pay alimony in the 
amount of $750 per month. See Madsen v. Madsen, 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 180 
(holding trial court is required to support, with appropriate findings of fact, any 
adjustments made to uncontroverted financial statements of a party); Holmstead v. 
Holmstead, 2004 UT App 147, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 172 (remanding for entry 
of further findings where trial court reduced husband's monthly expense for loan 
payment without explanation). 
In sum, the trial court's findings as to both petitioner's need and 
respondent's ability to pay are insufficient to support its award of alimony to 
petitioner. The award should be vacated, and if remand is allowed, the trial court 
should be directed to enter detailed findings on each alimony factor that the trial 
court is required by statute to consider. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's award 
of sole physical custody to petitioner, should set aside the trial court's finding that 
income should not be imputed to petitioner, directing the trial court on remand to 
impute income to petitioner in an amount consistent with full-time employment at 
her current hourly wage, and should vacate the trial court's award of alimony to 
petitioner. 
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RECITALS 
WHEREFORE the above-entitled matter came on before the Court for hearing, trial, 
and taking of testimony before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding in his 
Courtroom at Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department on Thursday, September 30, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. 
Petitioner, Kristyna Diane Rose was present and represented by counsel of record, 
J. Keven Hofeling (U.S.B. No. 7890); Respondent, Donovan T. Rose was present and 
represented by counsel of record, Lori J. Cave (U.S.B. No. 7192); and Jaceson Maughan 
(U.S.B. No. 9802) representing the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services was also 
present. 
The Court accepted a stipulation between the State of Utah and the parties 
(submitted as a separate order, a copy of which is attached hereto), then heard the 
testimony of the Petitioner, followed bythetestimony of the Respondent, as well as closing 
argument from the parties' attorneys. The Court further reviewed written submissions of all 
parties, and after having heard oral argument from all parties in open court, orally entered 
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision which is herewith reduced to writing as 
follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
[Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993)] 
[UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-4 [Findings] 
(UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R.52(a) [Effect]) 
(UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R.52(C) [Required]) 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction of the Court is pursuant to Utah state law as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4: "Jurisdiction -Appeals" 
[Jurisdiction of District Court] 
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah 
[Jurisdiction of District Courts; Effective July 1, 1985] 
Article I, Section 11, Constitution of Utah 
[Courts Open - Redress of Injuries] 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 2: "One form of action" 
[There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."] 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3: "Commencement of action" 
(b) "Time of Jurisdiction" [Complaint filed or summons and complaint served] 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 82 "Jurisdiction and venue unaffected" 
[These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state or the venue of actions therein.] 
Divorce Jurisdiction 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 "Procedure-Residence-Grounds." 
[Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided by law 
for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided in this chapter.] 
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Equity Jurisdiction 
Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall. 26 Utah 2d 124,485P.2d 1402 (Utah 1971) 
[Equitable principles can be applied in action at law] 
Williamson v. Wanlass. 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976) 
[Equitable principles can be applied in action at law] 
VENUE 
[Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)] 
[Neville v. Neville, 740 P.2d 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)] 
[Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1947)] 
[Kidman v. Kidman, 109 Utah 81, 164 P.2d 201 (Utah 1945)] 
2. Venue is proper in Salt Lake County, state of Utah, pursuant to state 
statutes as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 "Procedure-Residence - Grounds." 
[Petitioner or Respondent resident of county where action brought] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-13-7 "All Other Actions" 
[County in which cause of action arises, or county in which any 
Respondent resides at the commencement of the action.] 
PARTIES 
3. KRISTYNA DIANE ROSE, Petitioner, is an individual, a resident, and a 
"domiciliary" of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at all times relevant herein, currently 
residing at 14985 South 3200 West, Bluffdale, Utah 84065. 
4. DONOVAN T. ROSE, Respondent, is an individual, a resident, and a 
"domiciliary" of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at all times relevant herein, currently 
residing at 1043 South 800 East, Apartment 3, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-1262. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.17 [Social security number in court records.]) 
5. Petitioner's social security number is 529-78-9723. 
6. Respondent's social security number is 540-23-2385. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Divorce) 
RESIDENCE 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 [Grounds]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-2 [Right of Divorce - Husband & Wife]) 
7. PETITIONER is an individual, and a resident of Salt Lake County, and 
has been for more than three (3) months prior to the commencement of this action. 
Therefore, pursuant to statute, the Court has jurisdiction. 
8. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT were married on June 24, 2000 in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and have ever since been husband and wife. The parties 
separated on or about April 15, 2003. 
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DIVORCE & GROUNDS 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 [Grounds]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-2 [Right of Divorce - Husband & Wife]) 
9. PETITIONER has adequate and sufficient grounds for divorce from 
RESPONDENT for reasons as follows: 
(a) "Irreconcilable differences" exist between the parties. 
(b) "Irreconcilable differences" between the parties constitute 
adequate and sufficient grounds for divorce under the provisions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(h) [Grounds] as amended [Haumont vs. Haumont, 
793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990)]. 
FINAL JUDGMENT & DECREE 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-7 [When decree becomes absolute]) 
[Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 293 (Utah 1984)] 
10. Decree of Divorce should be a final judgment and decree immediately at 
such time as said decree is signed by the Court. 
Findings & Conclusions on 9-30-04 Trial Civil No. 03-490-3379 DA Page 7 of 22.. 
Rose vs. Rose 3rd D/C SLCo. 
90-DAY WAITING PERIOD WAIVED 
(UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R.105 "Shortening 90 Day Waiting Period...") 
(UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 30-3-18 "Waiting period for Hearing After Filing For 
Divorce -Exemption...") 
[Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975)] 
[Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979)] 
11. As this divorce was filed on June 2, 2003, the ninety (90) day waiting period 
has elapsed. Additionally, both parties have completed the Divorce Education Class. 
DIVORCE EDUCATION CLASS 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11.3 "Mandatory educational course for divorcing parents -
Purpose - Curriculum - Exceptions") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-18 "Waiting period for hearing after filing for divorce -
Exemption - Use of counseling and education services not to be 
construed as condonation or promotion") 
(CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-907 "Mandatory Divorce Education") 
12. This case is subject to provisions of law requiring that the parties enroll and 
complete mandatory divorce education class, and both have attended same, with the 
Petitioner's Certificate of Completion being filed with the Court on September 17, 2003, 
and the Respondent's Certificate of Completion being filed on April 27, 2004. 
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CHILDREN & CUSTODY 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 "Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -
Custody consideration") 
13. There has been ONE (1) child born as issue of the marriage as follows: 
Name: Birthdate: Social Security No: 
MADYSON JEAN ROSE September 5,2002 647-66-3630 
LEGAL CUSTODY 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.1 "Definitions - Joint legal custody...") 
14. Joint Legal Custody: Consistent with the two (2) custody evaluations that 
were reviewed by the Court in camera, the parties should share joint legal custody of the 
minor child. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.1 "Definitions - Joint legal custody..." 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 30-3-10.2 "Joint custody order..." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.3 "Terms of joint legal custody order" 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.4 "Modification or termination of order" 
Findings & Conclusions on 9-30-04 Trial Civil No. 03-490-3379 DA Page 9 of 22 ... 
Rose vs. Rose 3rd D/C SLCo. 
PARENTING PLAN 
(UTAH CODE ANN._§ 30-3-10.7 "Parenting plan - Definitions") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.8 "Parenting Plan - Filing - Modifications") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.9 "Parenting plan - Objectives - Required provisions -
Dispute resolution") 
15. Neither party filed a Parenting Plan with the Court. 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10. "Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -
Custody consideration") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 "Joint custody order- factors for court determination -
Public assistance") 
[Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996)] 
[Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870 (Utah Ct. App.1994)] 
[Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App.1990)] 
16. Both parties in their Petition and Counterclaim for divorce sought sole legal 
and physical care and control of the minor child, but the Court finds that sole physical 
custody should be awarded to the Petitioner, who has been primary caretaker and nurturer 
to the minor child, based upon the conclusion of the Court that same is in the best interests 
of the minor child; and in support of said conclusion the Court makes the following findings: 
a. Consistency of child care provider arrangements: consistency of 
care provider arrangements is an important issue in this child's life. Surrogate care 
has been and continues to be provided by the child's maternal grandmother, with 
whom Petitioner and the minor child live, at the rate of some twelve (12) hours per 
week. If Respondent were granted primary custody of the minor child, the fact that 
he works forty (40) hours per week would require him to obtain considerably more 
surrogate care. 
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b. Custody Evaluations: Two custody evaluations were performed in 
this case. Neither evaluator was called as a witness at trial, and neither party 
moved to enter the written custody evaluations of either evaluator into evidence at 
trial; however, the Court reviewed the written recommendations of both evaluators in 
camera, and observed that both evaluators in rather unusual recommendations 
concluded that the parties should share joint physical custody of the minor child. 
i. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-903: Considering 
the factors of Rule 4-903, the child's tender age and lack of siblings is all 
quite clear. The Court acknowledges and agrees with the conclusions of 
both custody evaluators, except for the conclusion that a 50/50 joint custody 
arrangement ought to be, or will be appropriate. The Court declines to 
acknowledge and accept that sort of arrangement primarily on the basis that 
it would be productive of considerable on-going dispute between these 
parties, and the Court finds that such would not be in the best interests of the 
minor child. 
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c. Allegation of physical abuse and inability of parties to cooperate 
and make joint decisions: In the judgment of the Court, joint physical custody is 
not appropriate. These parties have a long history of being emotionally at odds with 
each other. There have been allegations of physical abuse, but as has been rightly 
pointed out by Respondent's counsel, those allegations have been determined to be 
"without foundation" by the state. In the judgment of the Court, there is no evidence 
to support any claim of physical abuse. But there clearly are, in the judgment of the 
Court, emotional resentments and/or disagreements that would seriously affect, and 
indeed, in the history of this case, have affected the ability of these parties to 
cooperate and get along to the extent that would be required by a joint physical 
custody order. Accordingly, the Court declines to order joint physical custody. 
PARENT-TIME 
17. Award of sole physical custody of the minor child to Petitioner should be 
subject to Respondent's right to parent-time sharing as the parties agree, or if they cannot 
agree, parent-time sharing should be pursuant to the statutory guidelines of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 30-3-33, 30-3-35.5, and 30-3-35 (See copies attached hereto, and incorporated 
by reference herein). 
a. Use of intermediary for exchange of minor child between parties: 
Exchanges of the minor child between the parties should continue to be 
accomplished with the use of an intermediary until the parties can agree to dispense 
with the use of the intermediary. 
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CHILD SUPPORT 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 "Determination of amount of support...") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 [Support & Maintenance]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.3(5)(a) "Terms of joint legal custody order") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.18 "Limitation on amount of support ordered") 
18. Gross incomes of parties: The testimony of the parties was that the 
Petitioner earns $8.17 per hour working twelve (12) hours per week as at Bluffdale 
Elementary School, resulting in a gross income of $424.84 per month; and that the 
Respondent earns $12.70 an hour working forty (40) hours per week, resulting in a gross 
income of $2,201.33 per month. 
19. issue of whether Petitioner is underemployed: No persuasive evidence 
was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is underemployed, and in light of the fact that 
the Petitioner has cared for and will continue to care for the two (2) year old minor child in 
her home, the Court declines to impute full time income to Petitioner at her current hourly 
wage. 
20. Calculation of child support obligations: The parties have a combined 
gross monthly income of $2,626.17, eighty four percent (84%) of which is attributable to the 
Respondent, with sixteen percent (16%) being attributable to the Petitioner. The base child 
support obligation corresponding to the combined monthly gross income of the parties is 
$362.00. Petitioner's monthly child support obligation to the minor child is sixteen percent 
(16%) of the base child support obligation in the sum of $57.92, while the Respondent's 
eighty-four percent (84%) share of the combined monthly obligation to the child is $304.08. 
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PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-9.3 "Payment under child support order -Judgment") 
21. Commencing October 1,2004, Respondent should pay monthly child support 
to the Petitioner in the sum of $304.08, due and payable on the first day of each month. 
22. Immediate and automatic income withholding: Pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties made at trial, same having been reduced to writing and reflected in the 
Court's Order of October 28, 2004 (See copy attached hereto), child support should be 
collected by the Utah Office of Recovery Services by immediate and automatic income 
withholding. 
SUPPORT DURATION 
23. Support for the minor child should continue until the child reaches the age of 
majority [UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 "Eighteen" (18)], or graduates from high school in 
year normally expected to graduate [subject to continuation of support payments until last 
day of school year if child turns eighteen (18) while enrolled in high school] whichever 
event should occur last; however, subject to provisions of Utah state law relating to 
duration and review as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.2(8) "Application of Guidelines - Rebuttal" 10% 
differential - review every three (3) years 
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CHILD CARE EXPENSES 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(2) "Care of Children") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16 "Child care expenses - Expenses not incurred") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.17 "Child care costs) 
24. Each parent should share equally the reasonable work-related child care 
expenses of the parents. 
a. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent should begin 
paying his or her share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof 
of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be incurred, that 
parent may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being 
incurred, without obtaining a modification of the child support order. 
b. A parent who incurs child care expenses should provide written 
verification of the cost and identity of the child care provider to the other parent 
upon initial engagement of a provider, and thereafter at the request of the other 
parent. 
c. Notification should be provided to the other parent of any change of 
child care provider or change in monthly expense of child care within thirty (30) days 
of the change. 
d. A parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to 
receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the 
expenses if the parent fails to comply with the requirements of these Child Care 
Expense provisions. 
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MEDICAL EXPENSES 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.15 "Medical expenses") 
25. Respondent should insure the minor child with the health insurance available 
to him through his employment, and should forthwith provide substantiation of said 
coverage to Petitioner's counsel through his attorney. 
a. Each parent should share equally all out-of-pocket medical and dental 
expenses for the child, including the child's per capita share of the insurance 
premium, deductibles, copayments and all other reasonable and necessary 
uninsured expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and 
immunizations, as well as prescription glasses [including contacts], optical services, 
orthodontic expenses, psychological counseling, and prescriptions of all types (all of 
which should be considered to fall within the definition of "medical expenses"). 
b. A parent who incurs medical expenses should provide written 
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 
thirty (30) days of payment. 
c. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive 
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the 
parent fails to comply with the requirements of these Medical Expense provisions. 
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ALIMONY 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 " . . . - Determination of alimony --....") 
[Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)] 
[Rasband v. Rasband, 810 P.2d 828 (Utah Ct. App.1991)] 
[Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)] 
26. Findings regarding Petitioner's need for alimony: The testimony of the 
Petitioner was that she earns $8.17 per hour working twelve (12) hours per week at 
Bluffdale Elementary School, resulting in a gross income of $424.84 per month. Of 
Petitioner's gross monthly income of $424.84 per month, she testified that she pays 
$300.00 to her parents each month for rent for her and the parties' minor child. The 
Petitioner further testified not only that she is supported by her own parents, but that she 
requires food stamps, and is receiving in one form or another welfare supplements to 
support her and the Respondent's child. It is thus quite apparent to this Court that the 
Petitioner has a need for alimony, and that a reasonable and fair sum to be paid for 
alimony is $750 per month. 
27. Findings regarding Respondent's ability to pay alimony: The Respondent 
testified that he earns $12.70 an hour working forty (40) hours per week, resulting in a 
gross income of $2,201.33 per month. Respondent represented in his first financial 
declaration form signed September 15,2003 that his monthly expenses, excluding tithing, 
amount to $2,326.00, and represented in his second financial declaration form signed April 
27, 2004 that his monthly expenses, excluding tithing amount to $1,561.00. Averaging 
those two numbers, one would find it takes to support him, a single individual, some 
*TCM 
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$1,943.00 per month. That far exceeds any disposable earnings or income available to the 
Petitioner in this case. And furthermore, the Court believes the Respondent has 
overstated his expenses, and that the Respondent does have the ability to pay Petitioner 
$750.00 per month alimony, which Respondent should commence to pay Petitioner as of 
October 1, 2004; same to be terminable upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the 
Petitioner, and to be paid for a duration equal to the length of the marriage. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
[Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)] 
[Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)] 
[Munns v. Munns 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)] 
28. The personal property of the parties should be divided as they have 
heretofore divided it. 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1a-219 "Change of name - New registration") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1a-102(40)(a) Definitions - "Owner") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) [Division of Property]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1 )(c)(i)(ii)(iii) [Debts - Creditor Notice]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-6.5 [Debt Division - Notice To Creditors]) 
29. The parties should be awarded the motor vehicles currently in their possession 
subject to each party assuming, paying, and holding the other harmless from any and all 
debts and obligations associated therewith. 
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DEBTS & OBLIGATIONS 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-5 "Separate Debts") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) [Division of Property]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-4-3(d) "...Property & debt division...") 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-6.5 "Divorce or separate maintenance of co-obligors") 
30. Marital debt: The Respondent should assume, pay, and hold the Petitioner 
harmless from any and all liability for marital debt and for the debts and obligations set out 
in his second financial declaration, to wit: Comp U.S.A. in the approximate amount of 
$1,463.10; Best Buy in the approximate amount of $1,369.94; Circuit City in the 
approximate amount of $1,246.21; American Express in the approximate amount of 
$2,500.00; Navy Fed. Visa in the approximate amount of $4,300.00; U LaneO Debit in the 
approximate amount of $462.87; Sam's Club in the approximate amount of $480.00; RC 
Wiiley in the approximate amount of $1,000.00; US Bank Res. in the approximate amount 
of $1,000.00; Home Depot in the approximate amount of $300.00; and Rulon T. Burton in 
the approximate amount of $4,310.00. 
31. Separate Debts: Respondent and Petitioner should pay any and all other 
debts and obligations without limitation incurred without the knowledge of the other or upon 
which that parties signature does not appear pursuant to Utah State Law as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-401 "Liability of Parties" 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-2-5 "Separate Debts Contracted" 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Ut. App. Ct. 1987) 
[Where a person's signature does not appear on a note, he 
cannot be held liable for it, even if the parties so intended. 
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RETIREMENT AWARD 
[Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)] 
[Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Ut. Ct. App.1987)] 
[Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)] 
32. It was the testimony of both parties that they have no retirement. 
NAME CHANGE PROVISION 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) [Power of court to enter equitable orders]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-216 [Drivers License Name Change]) 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-1 thru 42-1-3 "...Change of name....") 
[See State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978)] 
33. Maiden Name: If Petitioner desires to take some name in the future other 
than ROSE, including but not limited to her maiden name, family name, or any other name 
of her choice, or name she was known by prior to the marriage, she may do so. 
DEPENDENT TAX EXEMPTION 
34. Subject to applicable IRS rules and regulations, the parties should alternate 
claiming the dependent tax exemption every other year, each year the child is eligible to be 
so claimed, beginning with the Petitioner claiming the exemption for the 2004 tax year. 
Respondent's eligibility to claim the dependent tax exemption should be contingent on 
Respondent being current with his financial obligations to the Petitioner related to the minor 
child. 
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TAX REFUND 
35. The Court finds that the 2003 tax refund in the amount of $2,740.00 received 
by the Respondent is joint marital property, that Respondent inappropriately used 
Petitioner's half of said refund, and that Respondent should disgorge Petitioner's half of 
same. Thus, judgment for $1,370.00 should enter against the Respondent in favor of the 
Petitioner for Petitioner's half of the 2003 tax refund. 
EXECUTION AND DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS 
36. Each party should cooperate in signing, endorsing, and delivering any and all 
documents, deeds, contracts, assignments and transfers necessary to carry out the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce as entered by the Court. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 [Attorney Fees & Costs]) 
37. Each party should assume their own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
38. Attorney for Petitioner should prepare Findings and Decree. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of 
this action; 
2. That the Petitioner should be granted a divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, to become final and absolute upon entry herein; 
3. That all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the Court pursuant to 
the above Findings of Fact; and, 
4. That the Decree of Divorce should be in conformance with the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. «, 
DATED this / A day of 
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** CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
& CONCLUSIONS OF LAWwith attachments were mailed via United States Mail first 
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Opinion by: Pamela T. Greenwood 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Tony Holmstead (Husband) appeals from the trial court's Decree of Divorce. We affirm in part and 
reverse and remand in part. 
Husband first challenges the trial court's division of his and Sindy Holmstead's (Wife) marital 
property. "In dividing the marital estate, the trial court may make such orders concerning property 
distribution . . . as are equitable." Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). "In 
making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude . . . ." Id. Accordingly, "changes will 
be made in a trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'" 
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, P 25, 993 P.2d 887 (citations omitted). However, when a 
court is dividing marital property, "'each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent of the 
marital property.'" Id. at P 26 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). Therefore, "an unequal 
division of marital property . . . is only justified when the trial court memorializes in commendably 
detailed findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at P 27 (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, the trial court emphasized that it did not make a '"mathematically incorrect' finding," 
as asserted by Husband, and that its "Findings and Decree . . . accurately reflected] the court's 
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equitable division of the parties' assets and liabilities." Although the trial court never used the term 
"exceptional circumstances" to justify the unequal division of the marital property, the court stated 
that Husband "had the ability to earn many times what [Wife] earns," and that "by awarding the 
house to [Wife], the court reduced [Wife's] need for alimony." Moreover, the trial court made it 
clear that it was awarding Wife her hair cutting business in its entirety because it was her only 
source of income. 1 
In Newmeyer, the Utah Supreme Court specifically noted that "the relative abilities of the spouses 
to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable determination of the division 
of the fixed assets of the marriage." Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1279 n.1 . Therefore, we conclude 
that the trial court's consideration of Husband's and Wife's earning capacities after the parties' 
divorce constituted an "exceptional circumstance!]," Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 at P 27 , 
justifying the unequal division of the parties' marital property. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by awarding Wife more of the marital property. 
Husband next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding alimony to Wife without 
properly determining his ability to pay. "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony . . . and [determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated.'" Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). When determining an award of alimony, a trial 
court is required to consider several enumerated factors including "the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (a) (iii) (Supp. 2002). Therefore, the trial court 
abused its discretion, if as Husband contends, it failed to properly consider his ability to pay. See 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (noting that trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to consider enumerated factors). 
In determining his ability to pay, Husband does not dispute that the trial court correctly calculated 
his income. Rather, he argues that the trial court understated his monthly expenses by 
discounting his testimony that his monthly 401 (k) loan payment was $ 618, and allowing him 
instead only $ 120 to cover the payment. After reviewing the record, we conclude that there is no 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that "$ 120 per month . . . [was] a more reasonable 
payment." The only evidence, other than Husband's testimony, pertaining to Husband's loan 
repayment obligation is his retirement account statement, which reflects that Husband's 
scheduled repayment was $ 308.49 per month immediately prior to the parties' divorce. For 
reasons that are not clear from the record, this amount was rejected by the trial court. Without 
additional information, it is impossible to ascertain whether the trial court's determination of 
Husband's expenses and consequent award of alimony constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, we remand for the entry of further findings detailing how Husband's monthly loan 
payment obligation was determined or, if there is no evidence to support the trial court's decision 
to reduce the 401 (k) monthly payment to $ 120, the trial court should adjust the payment to $ 
308.49 and recalculate the alimony award. 
Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $ 3500 of 
Wife's attorney fees (totaling $ 4500 at the time of the parties' divorce). Husband does not dispute 
that the trial court considered Wife's ability to pay her attorney fees. However, he maintains that 
the trial court failed to consider the reasonableness of Wife's attorney fees and his ability to pay. 
A trial court may award attorney fees and costs in divorce proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-3 (Supp. 2002). "However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the receiving 
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, P 18, 19 P.3d 1005 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Therefore, "an [attorney fee] award must be based on sufficient findings," and 
the failure to make such findings "ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial 
court." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
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Here, despite Husband's assertion to the contrary, the trial court considered his ability to pay. Prior 
to awarding Wife her attorney fees, the court specifically noted that Husband had an income of $ 
1100 per month. However, because we remand the issue of Husband's expenses and alimony 
obligation, we also remand for the trial court to determine Husband's ability to pay any of Wife's 
attorney fees incurred. In addition, there is no evidence that the trial court considered the 
reasonableness of Wife's attorney fees. Therefore, we also remand for the entry of findings 
detailing the reasonableness of Wife's attorney fees. 
Wife seeks an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. "Generally, when fees in a divorce case 
are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn prevails on appeal, then 
fees will also be awarded on appeal." Id. at P 20 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, 
the trial court ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attorney fees. On appeal, Wife has 
substantially prevailed, but not entirely. We therefore remand to the trial court to determine what, if 
any, portion of Wife's fees incurred on appeal is appropriate for Husband to pay and the 
reasonableness of such fees. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 The trial court also noted, based on Wife's testimony, that the entire balance in the business 
savings account was used to pay the business's expenses, thereby negating Husband's argument, 
unsupported by any evidence, that "there was nothing to offset against the value of the business 
assets." 
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Opinion 
Opinion by: James Z. Davis 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Brent Betteridge (Husband) argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of alimony 
because (1) it did not make specific findings regarding his income; (2) it awarded Andra 
Betteridge (Wife) nine months of retroactive alimony; and (3) it did not impute summer income to 
Wife. Husband additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of 
marital property. We affirm. 
"In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court must consider 
the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; the ability of the 
obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the marriage." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 
41, P 6, 974 P.2d 306 ; see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(vii) (Supp. 2003)1 (outlining factors 
that trial courts must consider when determining an alimony award). "If these factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, P 26, 9 
P.3d 171 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Husband does not challenge the trial court's findings, but asserts they are inadequate. The trial 
court made detailed findings regarding Husband's income and ability to pay the alimony award. 
The trial court found that Husband's annual pay varied because he "has historically been required 
to work mandatory overtime as part of his employment as a lineman and historically receives 
additional premium pay for overtime plus incentive bonus awards." The trial court correctly relied 
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upon Husband's historical earnings in determining the alimony award. See Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 
1262, 1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("In assessing spousal support, trial courts have appropriately 
relied on historical income rather than income at the time of the divorce where a party has 
experienced a temporary decrease in income." (quotations and citations omitted)). Specifically, 
the trial court noted that Husband's average monthly gross earnings for the years 1998 through 
2002 were $ 6166.50, $ 8496.34, $ 7743.67, $ 8715.17, and $ 6200.84, respectively. The trial 
court found that Husband's year-to-date net monthly income for 2002 was $ 2901.08 after taxes 
and deductions. Further, with respect to Husband's claim of $ 3775.57 in living expenses, the trial 
court found, inter alia, that "based upon the testimony at trial and the evidence offered and 
accepted," Husband had "some exaggerated and inflated expenses in his budget line items," and 
subsequently determined that Husband had the ability to pay $ 1600 per month in alimony. 
Because the trial court adequately considered the factors outlined in Rehn, see 1999 UT App 41 
at P 6 , it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Husband has the ability to pay the alimony 
award. 
Next, Husband argues that by ordering nine months of retroactive alimony, the trial court abused 
its discretion because it impermissibly modified a temporary order that it had issued. Husband's 
argument is misplaced. The commissioner, in his recommendations and in his certification of the 
matter to trial, specifically reserved the issue of temporary alimony. Because this matter was 
reserved for disposition, no temporary order on alimony was in place, and thus the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding nine months of retroactive alimony. 
Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not imputing summer income to 
Wife. "Imputing income to an unemployed or underemployed spouse when setting an alimony 
award is conceptually appropriate as part of the determination of that spouse's ability to produce a 
sufficient income." Cox, 877 P.2d at 1267 (quotations and citation omitted). "However, it cannot be 
premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise assessment requiring 
detailed findings." Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Husband presented 
no evidence that Wife had regular employment or that employment was available to her during the 
summer months, let alone evidence of prospective earnings.2 Because Husband's argument was 
essentially "premised upon mere conjecture," the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to impute summer income to Wife. Id. 
Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of marital 
property and debts. 
We afford the trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's 
property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
Daws v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, P 8, 76 P.3d 716 (quotations and citations omitted). The trial 
court received detailed testimony, exhibits, and charts from both Husband and Wife regarding 
their marital property and debts. Upon a review of the trial court's detailed and extensive findings 
supporting its division of marital property and debts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion. 
Wife seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal. Attorney fees are generally not awarded on 
appeal unless awarded below, except when an appeal is frivolous, or when a party demonstrates 
a "well-supported claim of changed circumstances." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Since attorney fees were not awarded below, and because Wife has not made a 
showing that Husband's appeal is frivolous, nor has she made a "well-supported claim of changed 
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circumstances," Wife is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Id. 
Affirmed. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge 
Concur 
Concur by: Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Dissent 
Dissent by: Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
I concur in the court's opinion except in one respect. Even without the kind of evidence the majority says 
Husband should have introduced if summer income was to be imputed to Wife, income should have been 
imputed, as a matter of course, at minimum wage, for a 40-hour week. Thus, I would remand with 
instructions to impute this minimal additional income to Wife, and to adjust the amount of monthly alimony 
as may then be appropriate. See generally Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, P 13, 984 P.2d 987 (referring to 
statute that considers minimum wage to be default level for imputing income in child support cases in all 
but a few circumstances); Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (noting, without 
criticism, that trial court imputed income to wife at minimum wage level in child support context); Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting alimony amount awarded by trial court 
was inadequate even with imputation of minimum wage income to wife). 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 We cite to the most current version of the alimony determination statute for convenience. 
2 During oral argument, Husband's counsel even alluded to the adequacy of the findings respecting 
imputation of income. 
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Opinion 
Opinion by: Gregory K. Orme 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Alimony is ongoing post-marital support paid to an ex-spouse. It is not payments voluntarily made 
to a spouse during marriage, even if the spouses live apart, and it is not "separate support and 
maintenance" ordered to be paid pending resolution of the divorce proceeding in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (1998), although such support is sometimes casually referred to as 
"temporary alimony." Thus, despite verbiage suggesting otherwise in the findings of fact, this 
really appears to be a case where no alimony was awarded, and the question before us is 
whether failure to award alimony was an abuse of discretion. Butsee Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT 
App 239, PP 13-15, 987 P.2d 603 (affirming "an award of alimony that ended before it began," 
because trial court gave credit for temporary alimony paid by appellee, where appellant's 
"transition into her new life . . . was complete" and appellant "had no need of alimony beyond that 
paid .. . under the temporary support order"). We are unable to make that determination because 
the trial court's findings of fact, while detailed in many respects, are inadequate, essentially 
because they are incomplete, as hereafter explained. 
The court found that petitioner earns $ 600 per month, not counting social security income for the 
benefit of her adult daughter, and had reasonable monthly expenses of $ 2,415. However, 
petitioner concedes that some unspecified part of these monthly expenses is attributable to her 
daughter. Those expenses are not relevant to alimony calculation. Moreover, while findings 28-34 
seem wholly irrelevant except in the context of imputing additional income to petitioner, and 
indeed strongly suggest the propriety of imputing such income to her, no specific amount of 
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income is imputed to petitioner. 
Because of the intricacies of respondent's income and expense picture, the unadorned findings 
that respondent's monthly income is $ 3,449, and thus less than his reasonable monthly expenses 
of $ 3,878, are also inadequate. To evaluate the propriety of those findings, we must know how 
they were derived, i.e., what expenses are included in the expenses total and how the income 
figure was determined. In connection with the income, it is particularly important that the trial court 
explain how it dealt with overtime compensation and historical income. 
The various findings touching upon the duration of the marriage and respondent's relocation are 
perplexing. The finding that the parties' marriage "was effectively over as of August 1994" is 
clearly erroneous given, if nothing else, respondent's continued voluntary support of petitioner. 
Insofar as the trial court's purpose was to limit the number of years for which alimony could be 
awarded, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 2000) merely sets a maximum duration, and the 
court is free to award alimony for a shorter duration in the exercise of its sound discretion. 
Moreover, while we see no basis on which the trial court may fictionalize the length of the 
marriage for purposes of section 30-3-5(7)(a)(iv), we acknowledge that under section 
30-3-5(7)(b) the circumstances leading to termination of the marriage, and each party's 
responsibility therefor, may well be germane. We also recognize that whether a marriage is of 
"short duration" for purposes of section 30-3-5(7)(c) & (f) is a relative and a factual matter, not an 
absolute and a legal one. 
In conclusion, a more systematic approach on remand will better enable us to evaluate whether 
the trial court properly exercises its discretion to award - or not to award ~ alimony. The court 
should first find petitioner's earning capacity, including imputation of additional income if she is 
voluntarily underemployed. Then it should find her reasonable monthly expenses, taking into 
account the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and excluding amounts attributable to 
the support of her adult daughter. If there is no shortfall between her reasonable expenses and 
earning capacity, the court's inquiry is at an end. See Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting "that the spouse's demonstrated need must . . . constitute the 
maximum permissible alimony award"). If there is a shortfall, the court should proceed to find 
respondent's actual expenses and then make whatever adjustment is necessary to find his 
reasonable expenses. It should then determine the amount of his income, fully spelling out its 
assumptions, adjustments, and calculations. If his reasonable expenses exceed his adjusted 
income, he presumably should not pay alimony other than as may be necessary "to equalize the 
parties' standards of living . . . [if this is a case] in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both 
parties' legitimate needs." Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, P 11, 983 P.2d 1103 . If 
his adjusted income exceeds his reasonable expenses, alimony should presumptively be ordered. 
However, alimony is never automatic, and if considerations spelled out in section 30-3-5 , 
applicable case law, or principles of equity suggest otherwise, the presumptive amount may be 
reduced or restricted in duration, all as may be appropriate under the circumstances. However, 
determining that such adjustments are within the bounds of sound discretion is possible only if the 
trial court's rationale is spelled out with care. 
The findings of fact entered by the court are vacated and the case is remanded for the entry of 
findings more fully explaining the rationale for the trial court's determination concerning alimony, 
and for such amendment to the alimony determination as the revised findings may suggest. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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Opinion 
Opinion by: Pamela T. Greenwood 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Scott Eugene Madsen appeals the trial court's award of alimony and attorney fees. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part and remand for further findings on the awards of alimony and attorney 
fees. 
Alimony 
We will not disturb a trial court's award of alimony unless "a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Although trial courts are given broad latitude in awarding alimony in a divorce proceeding, an 
award of alimony unsupported by sufficient findings constitutes an abuse of discretion. In this 
case, the trial court listed Mr. Madsen's expenses without explaining the reason for reducing some 
of the amounts from those submitted by Mr. Madsen. Although a trial court need not accept as 
true the financial statements of a party simply because the statement is received into evidence, 
see Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 231 (Utah 1997), it is required to support, with appropriate 
findings of fact, any adjustments made to the uncontroverted financial statements of a party. Cf. 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding trial court abused 
discretion by rejecting, without explanation, plaintiffs claim for alimony). Therefore, we remand 
this issue to the trial court for appropriate findings and any necessary adjustment in the alimony 
award. 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to 
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
Similarly, Mr. Madsen challenges the trial court's refusal to include property taxes, insurance and 
maintenance costs in his monthly expenses. The undisputed evidence submitted was that Mr. 
Madsen is responsible for these expenses. In addition, because Mr. Madsen has legal title to the 
home as a joint tenant and is obligated on the mortgaged he is legally responsible for taxes, 
insurance and maintenance costs on the home. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in refusing to include these costs in Mr. Madsen's monthly expenses. See Massey v. Prothero, 
664 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1983) (holding all cotenants owe a duty to pay taxes).2 Therefore, on 
remand, the trial court should include $ 147 in Mr. Madsen's monthly expenses, and adjust the 
alimony award accordingly. 
Mr. Madsen further argues the trial court erred in awarding alimony without considering the length 
of the marriage, as required under Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(7)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998). We disagree. In 
awarding alimony "in the sum of $ 550.00 per month for a period equal to the length of thirty-five 
months, which was the length of the parties' marriage," the trial court clearly considered the length 
of the marriage in awarding alimony. Additionally, we believe the trial court properly considered 
the relevant factors in awarding alimony, see Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), and therefore did not abuse its discretion regarding this issue. 
Mr. Madsen also contends it was error for the trial to consider fault in awarding alimony to Mrs. 
Madsen. He contends a trial court may not consider fault in awarding alimony because the 
purpose of alimony is to provide spousal support, not to punish either of the parties. See English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). While it is true that Utah courts have consistently held 
that the purpose of alimony is for spousal support, the Utah Legislature has recently enacted a 
statute stating that trial courts "may consider fault of the parties in determining alimony." Utah 
Code Ann. 30-3-5(7)(b) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Thus, the cases cited by appellant which 
pre-date the statute are inapposite and the trial court acted within its discretion in considering Mr. 
Madsen's acts of violence which lead to the destruction of the marriage. 
As a final challenge, Mr. Madsen argues the trial court was required to restore the parties to their 
financial condition before the marriage, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(7)(f) (Supp. 1998). 
We disagree because this argument is contrary to the statute's plain meaning. See In re Worthen, 
926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996) (holding court must first look to plain meaning when interpreting 
statute.) Section 30-3-5(7)(f) provides "in determining alimony when a marriage of short duration 
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage." Utah 
Code Ann. 30-3-5(7) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). The term "may" is permissive and gives the 
trial court discretion to restore the parties to their condition prior to the marriage. See Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted) (holding "may" is permissive 
and "should receive that interpretation unless such a construction would be obviously repugnant to 
the intention of the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or absurdity."). Thus, 
the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding alimony and distributing property without 
restoring the parties to their condition prior to the marriage. 
Attorney Fees 
Mr. Madsen challenges the trial court's award of $ 2,000 contending the amount was 
unreasonable. The decision to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings and the amount of 
those fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 
840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, we review the decision to award attorney fees under an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
At trial, Mrs. Madsen's attorney presented testimony explaining why $ 3,900 in fees was a 
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reasonable charge in this case. Based on this testimony and on its finding that Mr. Madsen has 
equity in the Bountiful home, the trial court ordered him to pay $ 2,000 in attorney fees. Because 
the trial court failed to explain its reduction in the amount of fees requested, and did not specify in 
its findings why $ 2,000 was reasonable, we remand this issue to the trial court for further findings 
supporting its award.3 See Foxley v. Foxley, 801 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversing 
award of attorney fees where there was "no admissible evidence in the record to substantiate the 
reasonableness of amount awarded"); Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (holding error to award less attorney's fees than requested "without finding the request 
unreasonable or offering any explanation as to the basis for the reduction."). 
Finally, Mrs. Madsen requests attorney fees on appeal. Because she has only prevailed in part on 
appeal, we hold that each party is responsible for his or her own attorney fees. See Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding "generally, when fees in a divorce case 
are granted to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn prevails on appeal, then 
fees will also be awarded on appeal."). 
Conclusion 
We reverse the trial court's refusal to include property taxes, insurance and maintenance costs in 
Mr. Madsen's monthly expenses. We remand for appropriate findings and adjustment of the 
awards of alimony and attorney fees. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 We note that the trial court's finding that Mr. Madsen was not responsible for these costs is 
entirely inconsistent with the finding that he has the ability to pay attorney fees because he has equity 
in the home which he can borrow against. 
2 Any testimony by Mr. Madsen's mother that she intended to convey title to him only after her 
death does not change the legal impact of the Quit Claim Deed she executed. 
3 The trial court may consider Mr. Madsen's motion to admit into evidence the affidavit of attorney 
fees. 
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